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Information Mechanisms and the Future of
Chinese Pollution Regulation
Ruoying Chen*t
Just as China has emerged as the world's fourth largest economy, its
environment is deteriorating at an increasing rate. The nation's environmental
degradation-particularly its rapidly rising level of pollution-threatens to
undermine the efficacy of environmental protection measures throughout the
world and could have global effects extending beyond the environment.
Commentators have attributed the deterioration of China's environment to the
gap between the enactment of pollution regulation measures and their
implementation. This gap is said to exist because of various institutional and
financial constraints imposed upon regulators of industrial pollution.' Without
challenging such lines of commentary, this Article argues that prior research has
overlooked two critical and related information mechanism issues that may
independendy contribute to the existence of the gap: (1) the manner in which
information about industrial pollution regulation is collected and disseminated
through mechanisms designed by regulators; and (2) regulators' preferences for
certain mechanisms. This Article focuses on China's environmental impact
assessment system ("EIAS") and scrutinizes two recently enacted measures that
are intended to enhance the EIAS's efficacy but will likely fail to accomplish this
objective, a conclusion that will become apparent through a revealing
comparison with the regulatory regime governing securities in the US.
John M. Olin Fellow in the Law and Economics Program and Lecturer in Law, University of
Chicago Law School. Many thanks to David Currie for initial advice; to Randy Picker, Ruijian Li,
and Qinghua Wang for stimulating and patient discussions; and to Douglas Baird, Richard
Epstein, Daniel Levine, Saul Levmore, Lior Strahilevitz, and Lesley Wexler for very helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to my editor Almas Khan for her lasting patience in
dealing with a non-native speaker and for her valuable suggestions.
t The Chicago Journal of International Law expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of this Article's
Chinese citations and references.
I See, for example, Hon S. Chan, et al, The Implementation Gap in Environmental Management in China:
The Case of GuangZhou, Zheng:hou, and Nanjing, 55 Pub Admin Rev 333 (1995).
Chicago Journal of International Law
In critiquing the current information mechanisms in China's EIAS,
including the recently promulgated guidelines on public participation in the
EIAS, this Article seeks to offer the following three preliminary observations:
first, too many resources have been devoted to collecting speculative
information for preventive measures that are often strategically produced by
regulated subjects, thereby depriving all parties, especially regulators, of the
opportunity to accumulate the appropriate type of human capital and efficiently
allocate limited resources; second, ill-designed regulation of intermediaries and
improper use of public participation requirements in China's EIAS together
provide enterprises with incentives not to disclose quality information and may
discourage some enterprises from entering the market; and third, for public
participation purposes, using the same framework to evaluate decisions made by
the government and by enterprises may be counterproductive. Such an approach
may help the regulator as an institution without necessarily providing benefits to
the public. In particular, shifting administrative costs and public pressure to
enterprises may not advance the goal of effective pollution regulation. These
three observations may also shed light on studies about the design of
information mechanisms in other Chinese regulatory regimes.
I. INTRODUCTION: CHINA'S ENERGY SHORTAGE AND ITS
REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION
The Pilot 2006 Enironmental Peformance Index ("EPi") found that in 2005
China's environmental performance ranked 94th among the 133 countries
surveyed2 and 15th among all 17 Asia-Pacific countries.' Air and water pollution
are apparently of gravest concern: China scored 128th overall in air quality4
(lowest among all Asia-Pacific countries) and 116th overall in water resource
pollution 6 (14th among 16 Asia-Pacific countries). Chinese officials have even
conceded that 80 percent of the nation's waste water is being discharged without
any treatment and that more than 75 percent of the nation's rivers are heavily
2 Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy and Center for International Earth Science
Information Network, Pilot 2006 Environmental Pe(ormance Index 3, available at <http://
www.yale.edu/epi> (visited Apr 22, 2006) (hereinafter EPI).
3 Id at 20.
4 Id at 51.
5 Id at 60.
6 Id at 52.
7 Id at 62.
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polluted.8 Pollution has had effects outside of China, threatening environmental
quality in neighboring countries. For example, pollution has caused significant
quantities of acid rain to fall in Japan and Hong Kong9 and has tainted rivers in
Russia."°
China's inefficient utilization of energy lies at the heart of the pollution
problem. China currently has one-quarter the energy efficiency of industrialized
countries" and is the world's second-largest energy consumer after the US. z
Since 1993, China has been a net oil importer. 3 It presently relies upon imported
oil to fulfill one-third of its oil consumption needs, and by 2010, China will likely
import one-half of the oil it requires. 4 In terms of sustainable energy, China
unsurprisingly ranks 111th among the 133 countries included in the EPIh5 and
only Mongolia fares worse than it in the Asia-Pacific region. 6 This relationship
between energy consumption and pollution exacerbates the global impact of
Chinese pollution. If China fails to control its pollution and endeavors to
maintain its current economic growth rate, it will need considerably more energy
from the global market, thereby increasing the price of oil and reducing the
share of energy available to other countries. But if China, burdened by rising
energy and pollution costs, fails to fuel its economic growth, the subsequent
domestic economic downturn could harm global markets. Thus, China's ability
to effectively control pollution generated within its borders, especially by
substantially improving energy efficiency, poses economic and environmental
8 Qu Geping, China's Environment Status and Legal Development (Zhong Guo Huan jing Xing Shi Yu Huan
ing Fa Zhi Jian She), Report to the National People's Congress Standing Committee (July 11,
2002), available online at <http://www.npc.gov.cn> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
9 For an article discussing acid rain in Hong Kong, see Lisa Hopkinson and Rachel Stern, One
Country, Two Systems, One Smog: Cross-Boundary Air Pollution Pol'y Challenges for Hong Kong and
Guangdong 6 China Envir Ser 19 (2003). For an article about acid rain in Japan, see Passing the Buck,
Economist 68-69 (Aug 21, 1993).
10 One recent example is the pollution resulting from an explosion of a Chinese petrochemical
factory, an incident that was concealed from the public for almost a week. See Greenpeace,
Benzene Slick on the Authorities' Reputalion (Dec 26, 2005), available online at <http://www.
greenpeace.org/russia/en/press/releases/benzene-slick-on-the-authoriti> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
See also Guy Chazan, Chemical Stew: Russian City Braces for China's Big Spill, Wall St J Al (Dec 16,
2005).
11 United Nations Country Team in China, Millennium Development Goals: China's Progress 30 (UN
2003).
12 Id.
13 Margret J. Kim and Robert E. Jones, China's Enej Securio and the Ckmate Change Conundrum, 19
Nat Resources & Envir 3, 5 (2005).
14 Id.
15 EPI at 55 (cited in note 2).
16 Id at 68.
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challenges that affect not just the nation's 1.3 billion people, but the entire
world.
Fortunately, some signs hint that positive changes may be underway in
China. The country's annual investment in pollution control reached an historic
high of 1.4 percent of GDP in 2004,17 compared with only 0.93 percent of GDP
for the period between 1996 and 2000.8 In 2005, the Chinese Communist
Party's single most important document required building an energy-saving,
environmentally-friendly society in the future. 9 Furthermore, energy efficiency,
resource efficiency, and environmental protection have for the first time
dominated the State Council's medium and long-term technology development
strategies. 20  However, like any other public policy adopted in China,
implementation of pollution regulations will be a gradual process. For example,
while industrial pollution, which amounts to more than 70 percent of all
pollution in China, has been subject to a comprehensive and advanced pollution
regime since 1979, it persists in elevated quantities.2'
Taking a different approach from existing commentary, this Article
examines possible flaws in how information is collected and disseminated in the
EIAS regulatory regime. The limited existing literature about information
relating to pollution regulation in China has focused on the narrow issue of how
to facilitate public access to information held by regulators,2 2 as opposed to
examining how regulators obtain and process information from regulated
entities. Such studies have neglected to consider that the quantity and quality of
17 State Environmental Protection Administration of China ("SEPAC"), National Environmental
Statistics Gazette (Quan Guo Huan ing Tong Ji Gong Bao), available online at <http://www.zhb.
gov.cn/eic/649371571659472896/20050610/8632.shtml> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
18 The 10th National Environmental Protection Five-Year Plan (Guo Jia Huan Jing Bao Hu "Shi
Wu" Ji Hua) § 1(1)(4), (Dec 2001), available online at <http://sdep.cei.gov.cn/soechina2001/
chinese/background/l0th5yplan.htm> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
19 See Proposal from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Preparation of
the 11 th National Economic and Social Development Five-Year Plan (Zhong Gong Zhong Yang
Guan Yu Zhi Ding Guo Min Jing Ji He She Hui Fa Zhan Di Shi Yi Ge Wu Nian Gui Hua De
Jian Yi) (Oct 11, 2005), available online at <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/
3759082.html> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006). An English summary of the key points is
available online at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/20061h/160403.htm> (visited Apr 22,
2006).
20 National Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Planning Guidenes (2006-2020) (Guo
Jia Zhong Chang ,Qi Ke Xue He Ji Shu Fa Zhan Gui Hua Gang Yao), Ministry of Science and
Technology of China (Feb 2006), available online at <http://www.most.gov.cn/
ztzl/gjzcqgy/zcqgygynr/index.htm> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
21 Hua Wang and David Wheeler, Endogenous Enforcement and Effectiveness of China's Pollution Levy
System, Working Paper 2-3 (World Bank 2000).
22 See, for example, Wu Changhua, Improving the Legal and Polio Foundation for Public Access to
Environmental Information in China, 24 Temp J Sci Tech & Envir L 291 (2005).
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information available to the public largely depends upon certain information
mechanisms. It is widely recognized that information asymmetry exists between
pollution regulators and regulated entities and that the communication of
information entails costs to both parties. Regulators must implement
mechanisms that induce information from regulated entities while such entities
accrue costs in supplying regulators with the information. In China, government
regulation of environmental pollution is widespread while private lawsuits are
rare. Because financial and institutional resources available to the government
agency in charge of regulating industrial pollution are circumscribed, information
mechanisms play a critical role in determining the efficacy of the government's
industrial pollution regulation regime.
A close review of China's EIAS can provide insights about information
mechanisms in the context of industrial pollution regulation. The government
must make predictions under China's version of the EIAS as well as under the
US form of the EIAS-encapsulated in the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 ("NEPA").23 However, China's EIAS has a distinctive feature as
compared to the US EIAS. While NEPA's purview is limited to federal
government activities,24 China's EIAS mainly oversees commercial and industrial
construction projects ("business projects"). Only a few government projects,
such as land development plans, are subject to the EIAS in China, and these are
recent additions.25
This distinction is crucial in China because the commencement of a
business project, but not a government plan, requires entry screening and
discretionary approval by the State Environmental Protection Administration of
China ("SEPAC") and its local bureaus. SEPAC attempts to gauge the
environmental impact of a proposed business project before reaching its
decision. To obtain the predictive information necessary to make an assessment,
23 National Environmental Policy Act, Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 852 (1970), codified at 42 USC §
4332 (2000) (hereinafter NEPA).
24 NEPA § 102(2)(C), 83 Star at 853 (calling for "proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment").
25 By virtue of the promulgation of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law (Huang Jing Ying
Xiang Ping Jia Fa) (2003) (hereinafter EIA Law). A short summary of the EIA Law in English is
presented in PRC Environmental Impact Evaluation Law 1600/02.10.28, China L & Practice
(Nov 2002), available online at <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.uchicago.edu/pqdlink?index=
6&did=320616871&SrchMode= l&sid= l&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&
VName=PQD&TS=1142808162&clientld=13392#fulltext> (visited Apr 22, 2006). A more
comprehensive summary of the EIA Law in English is presented in Neal Stender and Zhou Jing,
The New EIA Law and Environmental Protection in China, China L & Practice (Dec 2002),
available online at <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.uchicago.edu/pqdlink?index=5&did=
320617871&SrchMode= &sid= l&Fmt=3&Vlnst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName
=PQD&TS= 1142808162&clientId=13392#futext> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
Summer 2006
R. Chen
Chicago Journal of International Law
it relies almost entirely on the regulated entity's representations. To improve the
accuracy and general quality of such representations, SEPAC utilizes the
information mechanisms of regulating intermediaries and public participation in
enterprises' decision-making processes. However, Chinese regulators using these
mechanisms may not actually succeed in improving information quality. Because
the stakes of SEPAC's decision are particularly high for Chinese businesses
(unlike the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in the US, SEPAC wields
veto powers), such businesses have an incentive to supply SEPAC with
inaccurate information so as to increase the probability of receiving the requisite
project approval. The remainder of this Article will expand upon these
observations about current information mechanisms in China's EIAS.
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP IN THE REGULATION OF
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION
China's 1978 Constitution established the state's responsibility to preserve
and improve the environment and to regulate pollution.26 China's first
Environmental Protection Law ("EPL") was enacted in 1979 and amended in
1989.27 A net of national statutes and administrative regulations passed
throughout the 1980s and 1990s now covers almost all aspects of pollution: air,
water, solid waste, noise, and the marine environment.28 In recent years, more
advanced ideas, such as clean production, have been codified.29 Polluters and
26 PRC Const of 1978, art 11, available online at <http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/
zw.jsp?id=4365&lmfl=%C8%CB%B4%F3%CE%C4%CF%D7&label=WXZLK&pdmc=01060
2> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006). See also Burach Boxer, China's EnvironmentalPropect, 29 Asian
Surv 669, 683 (1989).
27 Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (1989), unofficial English
translation available online at <http://www.law999.net/law/doc/a/1989/12/26/00076404
.html> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
28 See, for example, Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Act (2004),
-unofficial English translation available online at <http://cq.netsh.com/eden/bbs/751605/html/
tree_4683065.html> (visited Apr 22, 2006); Prevention and Control of Air Pollution Act (2000),
unofficial English translation available online at <http://cq.netsh.com/eden/bbs/751605/html/
tree_4839263.html> (visited Apr 22, 2006); Prevention and Control of Pollution from
Environmental Noise Act (1997), unofficial English translation available online at
<http://cq.netsh.com/eden/bbs/751605/html/tree_4683846.html> (visited Apr 22, 2006);
Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law (1996), unofficial English translation available
online at <http://cq.netsh.com/eden/bbs/751605/html/tree_4839395.html> (visited Apr 22,
2006); Marine Environmental Protection Pollution Law (1982), unofficial English translation
available online at <http://cq.netsh.com/eden/bbs/751605/html/tree_4683556.html> (visited
Apr 22, 2006).
29 Cleaner Production Promotion Law (2003), unofficial English translation available online at
<http://cq.netsh.com/eden/bbs/751605/html/tree_4744032.html> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
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misbehaving regulators have also been subject to tort and criminal liability.30
SEPAC has adopted both command-and-control and market incentive
approaches 31 used in industrialized countries, including emissions standards and
pollution levies.32 China has also begun experimenting with new regulatory
methods like emission permit trading,33 green labeling, and environmental
performance grading.34
However, the lag between pollution control and economic growth has
become more pronounced over time in China. Commentators have attributed
the lag to the "implementation gap" between the existing regulatory framework
and its actual enforcement (particularly by local officials). 3 The gap can be
traced to the biased perceptions and incentives of government officials and to
the resulting institutional constraints-such as insufficient financing, unqualified
staff, and political impediments-imposed upon pollution regulators. 36 Like
Chinese courts,3 7 pollution regulators are to a large extent deprived of the
independence and capacity necessary to employ the appropriate regulatory tools,
30 For tort liability, see Civil Principles (1986), art 124; Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law
(1996), art 41; Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Act (2004),
arts 84-87. For criminal liability, see, for example, the Criminal Act (1999), art 338'.
31 For a comprehensive recent summary of the SEPAC pollution regulation regime in China, see
Jolene Lin Shuwen, Assessing the Dragon's Choice: The Use of Market-Based Instruments in Chinese
Environmental Polity, 16 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev 617, 626-31 (2004).
32 Wang and Wheeler, Endogenous Enforcement at 3-4 (cited in note 21).
33 For example, SEPAC started a pilot program of air pollution permit trading in 1991 and the first
agreement was announced in 2001. See S02 Emission Permit Trading Started (Er Yang Hua Liu
Pai Wu Quan Kai Shi Jiao Yi), Shanghai Municipal Government Environmental Education
Center, available online at <http://www.envir.gov.cn/info/2001/11/115469.htm> (visited Apr
22, 2006). However, another source has cited a July 2002 sulfur dioxide emission trading
agreement as the first reached under this program. See Environmentalist Feels at Home in China,
China Daily (Oct 31, 2003), available online at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/
78862.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
34 Gary McNeil and David Hathaway, Green Labekng and Energy Efficiengy in China, 7 China Envir Ser
72, 72 (2005). See also Hua Wang, et al, Environmental Petformance Rating and Disclosure: Cbina's
Green-Watch Program, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2889 (Sept 2002), available
online at <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract.id=636252#PaperDownload>
(visited Apr 22, 2006).
35 Chan, et al, 55 Pub Admin Rev at 335-36 (cited in note 1).
36 Wang Xinfang, SEPAC's vice director, identified these problems in the Explanation to the 10th Five-
Year Plan of the National Enironmental Protection (Gu Yu Guo Jia Huan ing Bao Hu Sbi Wu Jia Hua De
Shuo Ming) (Jan 11, 2002), available online at <http://www.zhb.gov.cn/epi-sepa/gzdt/wenzhang/
yl 3.htm> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
37 For a comprehensive explanation of similar issues in Chinese courts, see Stanley B. Lubman, Bird
in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao 250 (Stanford 1999).
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and especially to manage agents throughout the country38  in China's
decentralized political system.39 Local SEPAC officials must often regulate the
entities or affiliates from which they derive their sole financial support in
formulating and enforcing regulations. The absence of an independent,
accessible, and professional court has also contributed to the widespread
flouting of pollution regulations. 4° While citizen suits launched by non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") often act as a powerful supplement to
state action in the US,41 especially in tandem with the free media, citizen suits
remain nonexistent in China.42
SEPAC can thus be seen as an agency subject to external institutional
constraints, forced to sacrifice environmental values for economic gains. Policy
proposals have tracked this line of thinking, and have particularly sought to
enhance SEPAC's political and financial independence. For example, SEPAC
was elevated to full ministry status in 1998 and its budget was doubled in 2002.43
In addition, the Chinese government adopted a "dual-track" personnel
administration system for SEPAC in 1999 to increase the control that higher-
level SEPAC officials exercised over staff within the Chinese Communist Party's
personnel management system.44
However, political independence and financial resources do not
automatically guarantee that regulators and the public have accurate information
about pollution and abatement measures, or that regulatory objectives will be
achieved. Without a pre-existing mechanism to secure quality information, it is
unlikely that regulation will suddenly become effective once external constraints
are lifted. SEPAC could independently fail to achieve its objectives because of
flawed information and ineffective regulatory tools. A poorly designed
38 See, for example, Stockholm Environment Institute and UN Development Programme, China
Human Development Rport 2002: Making Green Development A Choice 76 (Oxford 2002).
39 See generally, Wenfeng Mao and Peter Hills, EIA in China: Impacts of the Economic-Political Reform on
Environmental Impact Assessment Implementation in China, 20 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal
101 (2002).
40 William P. Alford and Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of tbe Law in Addressing China's Environmental Dilemma,
16 Stan Envir LJ 125, 141-43 (1997).
41 Susan D. Daggett, NGOs as Lawmakers, Watchdogs, Whistle-blowers, and Private Attorngys General, 13
Colo J Intl Envir L & Poly 99, 100, 108 (2002). See generally Robert V. Percival, et al,
Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Polig 996-97 (Aspen 4th ed 2003).
42 With respect to NGOs, see Jonathan Schwartz, Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits, 77
Pac Aff 28, 40 (2004).
43 Id at 30.
44 Other government agencies were also placed on a "dual-track" personnel administration system.
See The Notice on Relevant Issues Regarding Adjusting the Administration System of
Environmental Protection Officials (Guan Yu Tiao Zheng Huan Jing Bao Hu Bu Men Gan Bu
Guan Li Ti Zhi You Guan Wen Ti De Tong Zhi) (1999).
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regulatory regime may distort the incentives of regulated entities considering
whether or not to disclose quality information. Even assuming that information
quality is not a concern, SEPAC staff may lack the technical and business
acumen to properly process available information and intelligently probe for
more information. Such sophistication can only be attained through exposure to
quality information. The tasks of collecting, processing, and disseminating
information, whether accurate or not, also entail costs, potentially rendering the
opportunity cost of faulty information dissemination quite substantial. One such
cost would be the loss of opportunity to accumulate the appropriate type of
human capital, a problem common to all parties affected by industrial pollution:
enterprises, regulators, the government generally, and the public. Another cost
would be the loss of resources inherent in applying ex post regulatory tools to
evaluate real-life data and effectively control pollution.
Due to China's relatively short history of pollution regulation and Chinese
society's relatively low technical and commercial savvy, SEPAC has much less
information and technical expertise than analogous government agencies in
industrialized countries. In addition, SEPAC and enterprises in China have few
resources to expend on pollution control, a constraint that may amplify the
negative impact of diverting resources to inefficient regulatory tools. Finally, as
Douglas North has pointed out, path dependence is a salient feature of
institutional development.45 Institutional change is an incremental process,
meaning that institutions with a past record of subpar performance often persist.
The historic origin of an institution, its current shape, and incremental decisions
by the agents entrusted with administering the institution limit the institution's
chances for future improvement.46 The current information mechanisms, and
their corresponding problems, are thus likely to continue in the pollution control
context and create barriers to enhancing the performance of the regulatory
regime. A closer inquiry into information mechanisms and regulators' rationales
for employing such mechanisms is thus of paramount importance in evaluating
China's EIAS.
111. INFORMATION MECHANISMS: A CASE STUDY OF CHINA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM
One fundamental change accompanying China's transition from a
centralized planned economy into a market economy is the manner in which
information flows between various parties: government regulators, enterprises,
and the public. In an ideal centralized planned economy, information symmetry
45 Douglas C. North, Institutional Change and Economic Pefrmance 98-100 (Cambridge 1990).
46 See id at 92-93, 104.
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between government and enterprises should be the norm since enterprises
function as an integral part of the government and are often run by government
officials. Because the general public is fully sheltered by a paternalistic
government in this system, there should be little need for citizens to obtain
information about enterprises' polluting activities. However, even in an economy
characterized by pure central planning, the government is not an "it," but a
"they." Under more realistic conditions-in China's actual economic regime of
centralized planning-information available to one agency, especially the
powerful drafter of economic plans, was not necessarily available to other
agencies, including SEPAC, and this situation has continued into the economic
transition phase. When regulation by one agency is compromised by coercion
from or collusion with another agency in service of the government's higher
priorities, regulators from the compromised agency, such as SEPAC, have little
incentive to seek information that will further the agency's objectives.
The gradual separation between the state and enterprises, coupled with the
emergence of a massive number of private enterprises, has widened the
information asymmetry between SEPAC and enterprises. Meanwhile, as between
enterprises and citizens, the possibility of holding polluters legally liable has
created an incentive for victims to acquire information for use as evidence in
court proceedings. The rise of administrative law in China and China's accession
to the World Trade Organization have also obligated the government to publicly
disclose information and to establish channels for public participation in
decision-making within certain regulatory areas.47 The gradual commercialization
of the media and the subsequent increase of critical reporting48 has also
contributed to the pressure for information about the activities of government
and regulated businesses. How China's pollution regulation system is handling
these newly emerging issues is a matter of vital importance.
One guiding principle of China's environmental protection regime is the
emphasis on ex ante pollution prevention as opposed to ex post pollution
abatement, 49 an approach that accords with the rationale of the centralized
economic planning system. If lost profits and business failures can be predicted,
and thus prevented or mitigated in advance, it seems that the risk of pollution
and its impact on the environment can also be predicted and accordingly
planned for. The increasing collection and disclosure of information thus
47 See, for example, Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, pt I, art 2(c)
(2002), available online at <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/table/wto/la02.doc> (visited Apr 22,
2006).
48 See, for example, Benjamin L. Lebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal
System, 105 Colum L Rev 1, 23-41 (2005).
49 Qu, China's Environment Status and Legal Development (cited in note 8).
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promotes accurate predictions. This idea of inadvertent rational bureaucracy
coincides with the core philosophy of the US EIAS adopted under NEPA.
NEPA embodies the "comprehensive rationality" model of bureaucratic
decision-making in that it assumes that all information germane to an informed
policy decision can be gathered expeditiously at little or no cost and can then be
factored into an EIAS agency's decision-making process.
50
While NEPA only targets federal government activities,1 China's EIAS
initially aimed more at business projects. After the National People's Congress
passed the EIA Law in 2003, some government plans came to be included
within the ambit of China's EIAS. 2 However, SEPAC's authority with respect
to government plans is relatively circumscribed. Aside from having jurisdiction
over business projects, SEPAC is also potentially more powerful than the EPA,
its US counterpart, in that it possesses a veto right over business projects.5 3 The
error rates that are purely attributable to the regulator's information stock and
judgment are likely to be higher in China than in the US since the scope of
activities subject to the EIAS is much wider in China and because th&
involvement of regulators is considerably more substantial in China (as
compared to the US). Thus, unless SEPAC's error rate in evaluating the
environmental impact of proposed activities is systematically lower than the
EPA's, an assertion for which no empirical or normative evidence is available,
China's ETAS would be particularly vulnerable to a charge levied against the US
EIAS under NEPA: the lengthy and costly EIAS process only generates
spotless, low quality information. 4 This finding is supported by empirical studies
of the EIAS in the US and other countries."5 Nonetheless, given the prevalence
of the EIA concept worldwide 6 and China's difficulties in enforcing ex post
50 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Govemment's Environmental
Performance, 102 Colum L Rev 903, 912 (2002), citing Jonathan Poisner, A Civil Republican Perspective
on the NationalEnvironmental Poliy Act's Process for CiiZen Participation, 26 Envir L 53, 76-79 (1996).
51 See NEPA § 102(2)(C), 83 Stat at 853.
52 Chapter 2 of the EIA Law addresses zoning and government planning while Chapter 3 of the
EJA Law deals with businesses.
53 EIA Law, art 25.
54 Karkkainen, 102 Colum L Rev at 905 (cited in note 50).
55 See id at 928-29.
56 Since the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development concluded at the UN Conference
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, numerous countries,
including all countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, have adopted some form of an ETAS. See Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992), available online at
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticielD= 116
3> (visited Apr 22, 2006); Government of Japan, Environmental Impact Assessment for
International Cooperation (2000), available online at <http://www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/
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pollution regulations (such as pollution levies and tort claims), it is worthwhile to
examine the potential value of China's ETAS before commenting on the
problems of the current information mechanisms that are now integral
components of the EIAS in China.
A. CHINA'S EJAS AND GOVERNMENT PLANS
Commentators offer two major justifications for NEPA in the US. The law
is said to enlarge the information bases for agency decisions and increase
transparency, which in turn promotes political accountability. 7 Legislators in
China seemed to have harbored similar motives in extending China's EIAS to
regulate certain government plans. This move was widely hailed as a
breakthrough helping to align China with the best international practice," but
the vision has yet to become fully materialized. In the US, the key mechanism
that enables NEPA to be "action-forcing"-both in terms of inducing
information from the public at-large and promoting transparency-is the
environmental impact statement, which is publicly disclosed.59 Government
plans in China are subject to no such disclosure requirements, thereby
preventing SEPAC from wielding a potent stick-public release of reports
detailing potential environmental damage-to force compliance. Chinese law
instead mandates a public consultation procedure on the draft EIA report in the
government planning context. As part of this procedure, the relevant
government department sponsoring the plan seeks the opinion of experts,
affected parties, and the general public via "meetings, hearings and other
forms."60 Without guidelines about which "other forms" are sufficient to satisfy
the legal requirement, the public consultation procedure has not been
particularly effective in prompting agency action. Since the EIA Law went into
effect in 2003, only one government plan in China has reportedly undergone an
coop/materials/10-eiae/10-coverl0.pdf> (visited Apr 22, 2006). Several international
organizations, such as the World Bank, have also embraced this concept. See, for example,
Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook 22-26 (World Bank 1998), available online at
<http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/06/03/0000
94946_99040905052283/Rendered/PDF/muli0page.pdf> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
57 Karkkainen, 102 Colum L Rev at 910-12, 915 (cited in note 50).
58 This is reflected in commentary by senior SEPAC officials. See, for example, Xi Jianrong,
Historical Breakthrough of Our Naion's EIA System (Wo Guo Huan Jing Bao Hu Shi Ye De Li Shi Xing
Tu Po), Legal Daily (Fa Zhi Ri Bao) (Sept 1, 2003).
59 All environmental impact statements submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter EPA) are available online at <http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/comments/>
(visited Apr 22, 2006).
60 EIA Law, art 11.
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EIA,61 casting serious doubt on the success of this intended check on
government plans that affect the environment.
To strengthen public disclosure requirements and enhance public
participation in the EIA of both government plans and business projects,
SEPAC recently promulgated a set of detailed procedural guidelines ("EIAS PP
Rules").62 The EIAS PP Rules are claimed to be China's first set of rules
providing for public participation in the government decision-making process.
63
However, because the EIAS PP Rules merely declare the government's intent,
64
as opposed to specifically providing for transparency with respect to
government plans and public scrutiny of government officials involved in the
planning process, the prospect that the EIAS PP Rules will have a meaningful
impact remains slim.
B. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF CHINA'S EIAS AS APPLIED TO
BUSINESS PROJECTS
Unlike government plans, business projects are subject to highly stringent
regulation by SEPAC under the EIAS regime. Because the threats of legal
liability and financial punishment only serve as soft constraints on polluters that
are owned by or otherwise affiliated with the state or state officials, 65 preventive
measures like the EIAS may be necessary supplemental tools in China. By acting
early, SEPAC, a relatively impotent and poorly financed agency, may share its
administrative burdens of information-gathering and enforcement with more
powerful and better endowed government agencies in charge of economic
61 See Chu Guoqiang, Guo Jiaxuan, and Fu Piyi, Environmental Impact Assessment on Government
Planning: Whj Is It Difficult to Show the Sword in Front of China's Environmental Crisis? (Gui Hua Huan
Ping: Mian Dui Zhong Guo Huan ing Wei fi Wei He Nan '_iang Jian'), Half-Month Talk (Jan 6,
2006), available online at <http://www.investchina.com.cn/chinese/huanjing/1085210
.htm> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
62 The Tentative Rules on Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment System
(Huan Jing Ying Xiang Ping Jia Gong Zhong Can Yu Zan Xing Ban Fa) (Mar 18, 2006), available
online at <http://www.sepa.gov.cn/eic/649086798147878912/20060222/15453.shtrml> (visited
Mar 17, 2006) (hereinafter EIAS PP Rules). For a news report in English about the release of the
EIAS PP Rules, see Yingling Liu, China to Strengthen Public Particpation in Environmental Impact
Assessments, China Watch (Dec 9, 2005), available online at <http://www.worldwatch.org/
features/chinawatch/stories/20051209-1 > (visited Apr 22, 2006).
63 See statement by Pan Yue, SEPAC Deputy Director, included in the official explanation to the
promulgation of the EIAS PP Rules (Feb 22, 2006), available online at <http://
www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/649094490434306048/20060222/15451.shtml> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22
2006).
64 See ELAS PP Rules, ch 4 and EIA Law, art 11 for a comparison.
65 Jinos Komai, The Soft Budget Constraint, 39 KYKLOS 3, 4-6 (1986).
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planning.66 Under Chinese law, the EIA report for business projects must be
prepared by specially licensed EIA service companies,67 which provide a
safeguard absent from the government planning context. The former director of
the National People's Congress, Li Peng, has noted that the EIA report
functions as a benchmark for ongoing regulation by SEPAC, helping to avoid
disputes between SEPAC and enterprises about whether regulated facilities meet
environmental standards.68 Under the "Three Synchronization System," SEPAC
is entitled to carry out on-site checks to ensure that the preventive and
mitigation measures prescribed in EIA reports are actually installed and
functional.69  By conducting case-by-case analysis, SEPAC may also
accommodate local diversity within the parameters of national environmental
laws.
A broader benefit of the EIAS, which operates like any other state permit
system, is that it may offer a solution for collective action problems that loom
large in injunctive relief actions,70 especially in countries such as China in which
local judges are often as biased as local regulators (the outcome of cases may be
shaped by extra-judicial influences from various sources)7' and in which the
violation of professional ethics is not uncommon among judges. 72 But while
China's EIAS appears promising, the limited available records suggest a less than
rosy picture of this system. SEPAC's official records demonstrate a high
percentage of compliance by enterprises: well above 80 percent between 1996
and 2004 and reaching a peak of 99.3 percent in 2004.73 However, some
commentators claim that the EIAS, which has operated for decades, has failed
because of SEPAC's insufficient capacity, dearth of expertise, and lack of
incentive to conduct a meaningful review of EIA reports.74 Other commentators
contend that local government intervention, resistance from powerful
66 See Mao and Hills, 20 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal at 104-05 (cited in note 39).
67 EIA Law, arts 19-20.
68 See speech delivered by Li Peng, Director, National People's Congress (July 2, 2001), available
online at <http://www.npc.gov.cn> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
69 Construction Project Environmental Protection Administration Rules (1998), art 16, available
online at <http://www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/649646449566416896/19981118/1022936.shtml>
(Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006). See also Implementing Environmental Management Plans: A
Review of Selected Urban Environmental Projects in China No. 1, p 2 (World Bank 1999), available online
at <http://www.worldbank.org.cn/English/content/safeguard.pdf> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
70 Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 Iowa L Rev 407, 412-13 (1995).
71 Lubman, Bird in a Cage 260--66 (cited in note 37).
72 Id at 278-79.
73 National Enironmental Statistic Gazette, available online at <http://www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/
649371571659472896/index.shtml> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
74 Shuwen, 16 Georgetown Intl Envr L Rev at 629 (cited in note 31).
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enterprises, and conflicting interests within SEPAC itself have combined to
make the EIAS largely ineffective.75 One analyst has concluded that EIAS
processes "have developed into pro forma procedures rather than effective
environmental planning controls., 76  These negative assessments are
understandable when one considers that SEPAC waited until January 2006 to
issue the first public order temporarily suspending business projects that violated
its EIA requirements.77
Even if the EIAS is valuable for an economy based on the centralized
planning model, with few occasions for the imposition of tort liability through
private actions, it may not be particularly beneficial when the economic structure
changes in at least three respects: SEPAC no longer enjoys a monopoly over the
human capital of scientific expertise; enterprises do not need the technical
assistance that the mandatory EIAS process is supposed to deliver; and many
abatement technologies may be new to all affected entities, including the
regulator. With regard to the first point, in China, EIAS-regulated activities have
recently become more complex and diverse as Chinese businesses have
acclimated themselves to the market economy. This state of affairs presents a
serious challenge to SEPAC's efficacy as the sole decision-maker with respect to
the construction of facilities that may potentially damage the environment. In
the past, SEPAC may have been more sophisticated than domestic enterprises,
especially those in the private sector, because almost all scientists were
government employees. However, largely because of several rounds of
government downsizing,71 SEPAC staff members have been joining private
enterprises, taking their expertise with them. The market has also enticed science
and engineering students with superior pay, better training, and more career
prospects than the government sector, and these students have increasingly
sought private employment after graduation. A second problem with China's
EIAS is that it seems to exist in part to coerce small and medium-sized domestic
enterprises into receiving technical assistance from the EIA service providers
while preparing their EIA reports and from SEPAC during the approval
process, an overly heavy-handed approach. Meanwhile, foreign enterprises,
mostly from industrialized countries, have been making rapid headway in China,
and these businesses often possess advanced technical expertise and greater
75 Mao and Hills, 20 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal at 105-08 (cited in note 39).
76 Homer Sun, Note, Controlling the Environmental Consequences of Power Development in the People's Repubic
of China, 17 MichJ Intl L 1015, 1024 (1996).
77 On January 13, 2006, SEPAC announced that it was temporarily suspending thirty commercial
projects. See SEPAC public announcement (an 13, 2006), available online at <http://
www.zhb.gov.cn/eic/649090092387794944/20050303/5765.shtml> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22,
2006).
78 Marilyn Beach, Local Environment Management in China, 4 China Envir Ser 21, 25 (2001).
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financial resources for pollution control than SEPAC, rendering the EIAS a
pure burden with little marginal value to such enterprises. Finally, because much
pollution control technology, such as the method for eliminating sulfur dioxide
from coal used by power plants,79 is novel to SEPAC, and to China more
generally, the EIAS may no longer be the most effective model to curb
pollution.
In sum, China's EIAS over business projects is premised on a highly
centralized decision-making model, and its efficacy depends heavily upon
whether the predictive information SEPAC receives from regulated entities and
through other channels (information that is subsequently used by the agency to
make judgments), is superior to that of enterprises. The emerging market
economy in China has created conditions under which SEPAC's informational
and judgmental pre-eminence may no longer be assumed, and the EIAS may
thus no longer be a cost-effective tool in China, at least in comparison to the
past. To support this conclusion, the following subsection will examine how the
operation of China's EIAS can potentially impose significant costs on both
regulated subjects and regulators.
C. BUSINESS PROJECTS AND THE COSTS OF CHINA'S EIAS
The most salient costs associated with China's EIAS come from the
information and financial burdens imposed upon SEPAC in reviewing and
approving EIA reports. SEPAC's director has even conceded that the
command-and-control approach is too costly for the government, especially
with the proliferation of small and medium-sized enterprises. 8° Diverse industrial
and commercial projects, each with varying levels of complexity, have made it
increasingly difficult to promulgate and apply a unified set of environmental
guidelines. Since the EIAS is only one type of regulatory tool, one must consider
the opportunity cost of expending resources on this system instead of another
regulatory mechanism. This is an especially serious concern when political and
economic decision-making have become largely decentralized and local
governments have gained more authority.81 Equipped with new powers, an
expanded local budget, and more sophisticated personnel, local governments in
China's more developed areas have started to experiment with new, tailored
regulatory tools like the total emission control and pollution permit trading
79 2005 Annual Analysis of the Status of Power Plant S02 Depletion (Jan 3, 2006), available online at
<http://hb.alnet.cn/Article/1844.htm> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
80 Geping, Cbina's Environment Status and Legal Development (cited in note 8).
81 Beach, 4 China Envir Ser at 24 (cited in note 78).
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systems.82 However, the mandatory nature of China's EJAS could force local
SEPACs to either exhaust the resources they may have preferred to spend on
experiments with innovative, more effective tools, or to save costs for alternative
tools by relaxing enforcement of EIAS standards.
For enterprises in China, the marginal costs associated with the EIAS may
be small in one respect, but quite sizeable in other respects. Enterprises may
already conduct some form of an EIA to calculate the optimal level of pollution
control measures. However, ensuring compliance with ex post regulations does
not necessarily require a thorough ex ante analysis like the current EIA report.
There appears to be no reason for enterprises to shift resources from later stage
evaluations to an ex ante calculation when little information is available at the
preliminary stages of a project and whatever information exists is of dubious
reliability. As a project progresses and more accurate information becomes
available, an enterprise may desire to adjust the mitigation and reduction
measures detailed in the original ETA report. Nonetheless, under the current
EIAS in China, a business project must be constructed in accordance with the
pre-approved ETA report unless it receives separate approval for any proposed
changes.83 The binding force and rigidity of the ETA report may create waste by
preventing enterprises from implementing optimal measures, or at least delaying
the movement toward efficient measures. SEPAC's lengthy review process may
also lead to the postponement of commercial activities that need to be carried
out with expediency. The combination of lost revenues from a delay and the
high cost of preparing an ETA report may induce enterprises to provide low
quality information in the EIA report and to pursue projects without adequately
accounting for environmental impact.
More importantly, since the EIAS is an entry control system, it is
susceptible to all the problems accompanying any regulation regime with a
grandfathering clause. In the context of business projects, the actual and
opportunity costs of China's EIAS can disproportionately burden new entrants.
Given the trends of tightened pollution regulations and increased parity in terms
of competition and technological innovation, new entrants are more likely than
incumbents to be sensitive to pollution regulations and better equipped to
comply with such regulations by constructing clean, efficient facilities. But when
new entrants are deterred from the market by the potentially overwhelming
costs of producing an ETA report and the uncertainty of obtaining project
approval, incumbents may become complacent. Without the threats of
competition and harsh punishments for overpollution, incumbents have few
economic incentives to adopt cleaner technology, resulting in more pollution
82 See discussion at note 33.
83 EIA Law, art 26.
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than may exist absent an EIAS regime. But even if the clear trend toward more
stringent enforcement of pollution regulations could actually cause the burden
of complying with the EIAS to become a first mover advantage favoring
entrants,84 the possibility of competing with incumbents is the condition for
such an advantage to be meaningful. Finally, one may argue that the popular
practice of providing subsidies for pollution abatement could encourage new
entrants and thereby cancel out potential losses of competition while still
increasing the level of pollution industry-wide.8" However, this argument is only
plausible if the new entrants are expected to receive the subsidies, which seems
unlikely in China. Incumbent Chinese enterprises, in large part wholly or partially
owned by the state, tend to receive the bulk of subsidies while new entrants are
disproportionately private enterprises. Coal power plants provide an illustrative
example of this phenomenon.86
The implicit costs underlying China's EIAS also merit consideration. The
first type of implicit cost is SEPAC officials' lost opportunity to develop the type
of human capital that can only be acquired by processing of real-world data.
Even though descriptive information about proposed business projects is
necessary for both SEPAC and regulated enterprises, information contained in
EIA reports is mostly predictive, unlike data generated when a project is in
operation. The knowledge stock accumulated by SEPAC in processing ex ante-
as opposed to ex post-information is also different. When SEPAC officials
must ponder conclusions based upon tentative assumptions, they are deprived
of the time and resources to assess real world data, and they accordingly lose the
opportunity to accumulate expertise in addressing problems arising from
operational projects. Moreover, this loss of real world expertise in the context of
the EIAS could appreciably hamper the effectiveness of SEPAC regulations
generally. A recent empirical study has indicated that human capital contributes
to the institution-building capacity of local SEPAC officials seven times more
than financial capital, 7 meaning that lost human capital can substantially hamper
the efficacy of SEPAC regulation.
A problematic aspect of EIA services in China-the popular fee payment
schedule-may augment informational distortions and further reduce the value
84 See generally Michael E. Porter and Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J Env Persp 97 (1995); Michael E. Porter and Claas van
der Linde, Green and Competitive: Ending the Stalemate, 73 Harv Bus Rev 120 (1995).
85 William J. Baumol and Sallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Polio7 212-34 (Cambridge
1988).
86 The Vice-Director of the State SEOC has noted this point. Xinfang, Explanation to the 10th Five-
Year Plan (cited in note 36).
87 Wanxin Li, A Survey of Institutional Capaciy of Local EPBs in China 25 (2005), available online at
<http://mumford.albany.edu/chinanet/shanghai2005/iwanxinen.doc> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
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of the information stock available to SEPAC officials. Under this schedule,
enterprises only pay a small fraction of the agreed-upon fee to ETA service
providers up front, with the remaining portion due after approval of the
submitted ETA report.88 EJA service providers thus have a significant financial
incentive to receive approval of their reports, and they may present inflated
information to increase this probability. Unless SEPAC officials grant approvals
without reviewing EIA reports, the officials are likely to amass and rely upon a
stock of overly optimistic information. In addition, ETA service providers eager
to expedite the approval process and reap revenues may attempt to exert
influence over SEPAC, particularly by exploiting personal connections.
This observation suggests a second implicit cost in China's EIAS-the cost
of rent-seeking. Since EIA service providers must be licensed, SEPAC officials
may seek rents from these providers. The process of approving ETA reports also
offers many opportunities for government officials to engage in rent-seeking
behavior. In China, such rents have to some extent become institutionalized.
ETA service providers formally or informally associated with SEPAC attract
clients willing to pay premiums for expedited approvals, with some
unscrupulous companies compromising service quality to bolster profits. EIA
service providers often receive subsidies from SEPAC or are otherwise affiliated
with SEPAC's approval authority, and they may share revenues, which are
largely contingent upon receiving approval of their EIA reports, with SEPAC
officials.89 This income stream gives local SEPAC officials incentives to both
expand the EIAS regime's mandatory features--enabling ETA service providers
to add to their clientele while increasing fees-and issue more approvals. In the
ETAS context, the self-expanding and self-replicating aspects of rent-seeking
divert resources from more productive and cost-effective activities like
monitoring facilities to obtain real-time data.90 To diminish these steep social
costs, Chinese legislators have taken some measures to ensure that ETA service
providers remain independent of SEPAC. 9' However, if the current licensing
scheme and approval process remain intact, legal prohibitions on rent-seeking
alone are likely to have only a minimal impact in reality. Actions by local SEPAC
88 Liu Shixin, Yuanmingmuan Event Exposed Institutional Defects of the Environmental Impact Assessment
System (Yuan Ming Yuan Huan Ping Bat La Dao De WeiJi), China Youth, (Apr 22, 2005), available
online at <http://env.people.com.cn/GB/35525/3382568.html> (Chinese) (visited Apr 13,
2006).
89 Peter Hills and C.S. Man, Environmental Regulation and the Industrial Sector in China: The Role of Informal
Relationships in Polfy Implementation, 7(2) Bus Strategy & Envir 53, 65 (May 1998).
90 Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent Seeking So Costy to Growth?,
83 Am Econ Rev 409, 412-13 (1993) (demonstrating how public rent-seeking stifles innovation
more than production).
91 EIA Law, art 19.
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officials will continue to encourage the production of diluted quality EIA reports
and will contribute to the ineffectiveness of agency review procedures.
Assuming that inefficiencies from relatively low quality information and
high costs to all parties are endemic to any EIAS, the magnitude of wasted
resources in China would far exceed the amount of wasted resources under
NEPA in the US. The massive number of business projects covered by China's
EIAS has boosted the number of EIA reports produced in China, especially
with the nation's rapid infrastructure development and economic growth. While
SEPAC approved more than 100,000 EIA reports in 2000 and 2001, and has
approved more than 200,000 such reports annually since 2002,92 the annual rate
of environmental impact statement production in the US has declined to around
500 per year.9' The most important reason for this disparity is that business
projects fall within SEPAC's jurisdiction while NEPA only covers some federal
government activities. Another reason for this striking differential may be that
while the threshold to trigger an environmental impact statement under NEPA
is relatively high-an activity must "significantly affecto the quality of the
human enviroument" 94 -- China's EIAS requires an EIA report for business
projects with even a slight possible negative environmental impact.9 The
Chinese government has seemingly overlooked the high costs of the stringent
EIA regime, including the diversion of resources from ex post regulatory tools.
In fact, Chinese legislators and SEPAC have introduced more costly measures
aimed at improving the quality of information contained in EIA reports. The
following subsections will discuss two of these measures.
1. Regulating Intermediaries to Control Information Quality
In China, an EIA report must be prepared by specially licensed EJA service
providers, which are legally independent from SEPAC. 96 These providers are
obligated to provide thorough, accurate information about the potential
environmental impact of a project.97 As intermediaries between SEPAC and
enterprises seeking business project approvals, service providers are aptly
situated to ensure that enterprises are regulated on the basis of quality
information.
92 The number of EIA reports approved by SEPAC is as follows: 139,000 in 2000; 187,000 in 2001;
about 230,000 in 2002; 278,000 in 2003; and 320,000 in 2004. See National Environmental Statistics
Gazette (cited in note 17).
93 Karkkainen, 102 Colum L Rev at 905 n 6 (cited in note 50).
94 NEPA § 102(2)(C), 83 Star at 853.
95 EJA Law, arts 16(2), 22.
96 EJA Law, art 20.
97 EIA law, art 19.
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It is common for a regulator to "outsource" compliance obligations to
third-party private entities-in China's EIAS, EIA service providers-in order
to reduce costs and take advantage of information held in the market.98 An
instructive analogy to describe the position of EIA service providers in China's
EIAS comes from the field of securities regulation in the US. In the securities
regulation context, underwriters help issuers with information processing, price
determinations, and, ultimately, sales of securities. Underwriters are also obliged
to conduct a due diligence investigation of issuers' registration statements,
thereby checking the accuracy of information provided by issuers to the public.
Commentators find it justifiable to improve information quality by regulating
underwriters in this manner.99 Although no empirical evidence has confirmed
that imposing this duty upon underwriters promotes efficiency,100 it seems that
underwriters are not unduly burdened by due diligence requirements because
underwriters need accurate information to promote their own interests-namely
to protect their reputation and reduce risks in firm underwriting.'0 1 Thus,
underwriters are not compelled to work for purely public benefit; instead, the
public incidentally reaps advantages from the imposition of due diligence
obligations upon underwriters. EIA service providers seem similarly situated
because both the popular fee schedule discussed above and the threat of
competition should motivate an EIA service provider to make efforts to burnish
its reputation, notably by producing quality work. Thus, requiring EIA service
providers to attest to the accuracy of information in the EIA reports would
appear to be a justifiable legal measure comparable to due diligence requirements
in the securities underwriting context.
However, because the nature of information in the two settings differs
markedly, it is impossible to use regulatory measures from the underwriting
context to improve the quality of information provided by EIA service
providers. In the field of securities regulation, the majority of the relevant
information involves facts, and the registration statement tends to describe
events that have already occurred. Setting aside cost considerations, it should
theoretically be possible to provide information that properly reflects such facts
without major omissions and mistakes. An increased probability that
98 See, for example, Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L J 389, 402-04
(2003).
99 See, for example, Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation,
98 Harv L Rev 747, 769 (1985). But see George J. Benston, The Value of the SECs Accounting
Disclosure Requirements, 44 Accounting Rev 515, 517-18 (1969).
100 Langevoort, 98 Harv L Rev at 770 (cited in note 99).
101 Id. "Firm underwriting" is a term widely used in the context of securities offerings to describe the
popular practice of underwriters committing to buy securities if the offering fails to attract
sufficient investors.
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information is accurate leads to fewer distortions in investors' decision-making
processes, and investors are accordingly willing to pay a premium for more
accurate information.'0 2 In addition, even though a registration statement usually
includes some pro forma financial information, the statement is not audited.
Hence, neither underwriters nor their financial advisors are responsible for the
accuracy of such pro forma financial information; the judgment of potential
risks and returns in buying securities is left to the potential investor. But in the
EIA context, information comes from tentative projections that resemble pro
forma information more than the descriptive information in the aforementioned
registration statement, meaning that there is a significant chance that EIA
reports contain inaccurate information. Since only hindsight can determine
whether or not information in EIA reports reflects reality, such information has
less quality than information provided by underwriters involved with preparing
documents for securities regulation purposes.
Once costs and cost allocations are taken into account, the EJAS appears
to diverge even further from the securities regulation paradigm. Since pollution
regulation is a classic public good, especially in countries like China where
resources are owned by the state, free-riding by beneficiaries is inevitable.
Although the general public cannot be forced into paying a premium for
improved predictive accuracy in EIA reports-while potential shareholders in
the securities regulation context are willing to pay for more accurate information
in registration statements-this distinction does not automatically justify shifting
costs to enterprises or EIA service providers in the EIAS context. One
proffered reason to impose marginal costs on service providers has been that
because they benefit from the elevated entry barriers of the licensing scheme,
they are the best candidates to bear marginal costs.103 This argument seems even
more potent when one considers that EIA service providers in China were at
one time often affiliated with SEPAC.
However, burdening these service providers with marginal costs would be
the equivalent of taxing them for work that contributes to the public's well-
being, but that does not necessarily promote their interests. As ETA service
providers log more hours to ensure accuracy, they incur additional costs. These
supplementary costs are not invariably correlated with a higher probability of
receiving SEPAC approval for a business project, and such costs may thus not
strengthen a provider's competitive advantage in the market. This line of
reasoning suggests a critical difference between EIA service providers and
underwriters-accuracy contributes to the underwriters' success, but provides
minimal, if any, benefit to EIA service providers. In a non-competitive EIA
102 Id at 769.
103 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulalion, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3, 13-16 (1971).
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service market, an arrangement that the licensing regime seems to promote (at
least in a given local market), EIA service providers can shift extra costs to
clients, just as underwriters do; otherwise, the providers must ordinarily bear the
brunt of the costs. In either case, the entity generating information, not the
beneficiary of the information, is fully burdened with costs, and such an entity
may have an incentive to reduce costs by not seeking rigorously proven
information. SEPAC may exercise stringent scrutiny, but this is of little avail as a
practical matter because of the speculative nature of information contained in
EIA reports. More importantly, enforcement by SEPAC is costly and diverts
resources from potentially more effective regulatory tools.
2. Burdening Businesses through the Imposition of Public
Participation Requirements
While government plans with environmental implications are not subject to
specific public participation requirements, the EIAS PP Rules mandate
procedures for public participation in the decision-making process with respect
to business projects. In addition, the EIAS PP Rules require SEPAC to publicly
disclose when it receives, and either approves or rejects, an EIA report."4 Under
the newly enacted EIAS PP Rules, an enterprise will have to make two rounds
of public disclosures: before drafting its EIA report and after preparing the draft
report for approval. 105 Public opinion will have to be solicited in designated
forms, including public surveys, expert consultation meetings, public
consultation meetings, and public hearings. 106 The EIAS PP Rules may be
intended to align China's EIAS more with that of industrialized countries by
ensuring the public some measure of input in government decision-making. For
example, in the US, public participation under the NEPA regime serves two
major purposes: it enlarges the information base for agency decision-making and
it enhances political accountability. NEPA's framework for public participation
was created by regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality in
1978.107 The US's movement toward public participation in government
originated from distrust about technocrats' ability to serve the public interest in
an impartial fashion. 8 Public participation requirements encoded in law were
104 EIAS PP Rules, art 13.
105 EIAS PP Rules, arts 8, 9.
106 EIAS PP Rules, art 12.
107 See generally Poisner, 26 Envir L at 71-75 (cited in note 50). Under this framework, federal
agencies are required to seek written or oral comments on the draft environmental impact
statement from the general public. Id at 74.
108 See generally Richard B. Stewart and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv L
Rev 1193, 1238-39 (1982).
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justified as a means of promoting agency development of, and adherence to,
public values.0 9 However, the instrumental values of enlarging the regulating
agency's information base and bolstering its political accountability have little
relevance in the context of enterprises deciding which documents filed with
SEPAC will help win project approvals.
With respect to the instrumental value of increasing the regulating agency's
information base, even if one assumes that the information base is the same for
regulators and enterprises, it is worth noting that the public's input may not be
particularly useful for a number of reasons. First, public concern about pollution
can be highly biased. Several empirical studies demonstrate that public
complaints regarding pollution are strongly correlated with the severity of air
pollution but are apparently unrelated to the magnitude of water pollution.110
Furthermore, the credibility of such complaints is highly affected by the levels of
local education and per capita income.1" Since education and income levels vary
widely across China, the instrumental value of general public opinion on the
subject of pollution is highly questionable. Second, the general public is
susceptible to the problem of bounded rationality, especially in assessing
environmental risks." 2 The media could play a critical role in disseminating
information if public disclosure and public participation requirements became
ingrained in society. However, when the target of such requirements is a
commercial enterprise instead of a government entity, a cautious approach is
imperative. One commentator has observed that in China the media's views can
be determinative, not merely influential, because officials and the public accept
media "findings" as fact, a scenario that does not necessarily enhance
independent, rational thinking and political accountability." 3 Finally, there is no
assurance that citizens who participate in the preparation of EIA reports will not
seek to advance an agenda unrelated to environmental concerns. Because the
public participation mechanism to be created by the EIAS PP Rules is a pilot
project among Chinese government agencies,"' it could attract many citizens
already in the process of filing public complaints about non-environmental
matters. Public participation in China's EIAS may trivially contribute to the
109 Id at 1278-82.
110 Susmita Dasgupta and David Wheeler, Ciizen Complaints as Environmental Indicators: Evidence from
China, Policy Research Working Paper No 1704 (World Bank 1997), available online at
<http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1997/01 /01/0
00009265_3970625093907/Rendered/PDF/mul-page.pdf> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
M Id.
112 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law
and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1518-21 (1998).
113 Liebman, 105 Colum L Rev at 8-9 (cited in note 48).
114 See the statement by Pan Yue (cited in note 63).
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accuracy of descriptive information, but at a tremendous cost, especially by
prolonging delays.
In addition, even if the second instrumental value-political
accountability-is a normative value worth pursuing, it may easily be defeated in
the context of business projects undergoing scrutiny in China's EIAS. Including
more information in EIA draft reports will increase the likelihood that citizens
will find a bone of contention, and at the expense of businesses instead of the
government. A given EIA draft report meeting or hearing mandated under the
EIAS PP Rules could become a political forum, and this unpleasant prospect
could deter new entrants from the market. Enterprises and EIA service
providers may thus have a significant incentive not to make sensible predictions
and provide solid information. Instead, EIA reports may become highly
technical and incomprehensible to SEPAC, unnecessarily burdening the agency
during the review process. Obscure EIA reports may ultimately preclude
meaningful public participation.
In crafting a better alternative to the current EIAS regime, one must
therefore distinguish between business projects and government plans in terms
of the degree of public participation that should be required and the stage at
which such participation should be allowed. Since public participation is a tool
for honing the government's decision-making processes, it seems logical to
mandate public disclosure of finalized EIA reports involving business projects. In
this proposed system, all EIA reports submitted by enterprises would have to be
filed with SEPAC and disclosed to the public, with redactions to ensure the
confidentiality of commercial and national security interests. By delaying
disclosure and public participation until after enterprises tender their final EIA
reports, the government could provide enterprises with more of an incentive to
include socially valuable information in the reports. 5 Article 13 of the EIAS PP
Rules requires SEPAC to make public disclosures after receiving applications
from enterprises, but, in contrast with the scheme proposed here, Article 13 only
mandates that "information relating to the receipt of applications ' 6-not actual
EIA reports"'-be publicly revealed. Public consultation is also a necessary
measure enabling the public to influence SEPAC's decisions. While Article 13 of
the EIAS PP Rules touches upon this issue, it limits public consultation to cases
involving "significant public objections." SEPAC may thus readily avoid the
public consultation procedure by tailoring the information that is disclosed to
115 Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser, and Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Information
Strategy and Regulatory Polimaking, 89 Minn L Rev 277, 330-31 (2004).
116 EIAS PP Rules, art 13.
117 Id.
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the public. The agency may conceal controversial information contained in EIA
reports that could give rise to "significant public objections."
In the government planning context, realizing the normative and
instrumental objectives of the EIA Law would require closely tracking the
NEPA model, notably by mandating public participation in the draft and final
stages of the EIA report production process. However, one must acknowledge
that a number of business projects are likely to be constructed and operated by
enterprises affiliated with the government and that this affiliation could often
lead enterprises to neglect preparing and filing EIA reports. But instead of
classifying all business projects as government plans for the purposes of public
participation requirements, one could redefine the line between government
plans and business projects and notify the public about this demarcation. For
example, one could imagine a regime in which the names of controlling
shareholders and sponsors of business projects would have to be publicly
disclosed, along with information about their affiliation with the local or central
government.
This alternative solution differs from the EIAS PP Rules critiqued above in
two vital respects-who absorbs the costs and who faces the public. Enterprises
currently bear both these burdens, but it may be more beneficial to the public if
such responsibilities were shifted to SEPAC. Public pressure could arguably
facilitate SEPAC's review of government plans given SEPAC's weak position
relative to some other government agencies. However, for business projects, a
field in which SEPAC can more robustly exercise expert scrutiny, the agency no
longer needs to rely upon extensive public participation. Furthermore, public
participation does not improve political accountability before the final EIA
report is submitted, when the only relevant relationship is that between the
enterprises and the EIA service providers. The EIAS PP Rules disregard these
insights and enable SEPAC to shift the administrative costs of public disclosure
and public participation, as well as the political pressure to make difficult
balancing decisions, to enterprises. However, because of China's dismal record
on pollution regulation and its lack of public involvement in government
decision-making, one can surmise that the public will welcome the EIAS PP
Rules. With the recently promulgated EIAS PP Rules, public interest in the
environment may rise, in turn enhancing SEPAC's political and financial clout
within the government118 and increasing its efficacy. It is difficult to ascertain
whether the advantages from this arrangement or the benefits from the
alternative solution proposed here will promote the public good to a greater
118 Carlos Wing Hung Lo and Sai Wing Leung, EnvironmentalAgengy and Pubic Opinion in Guangzhou:
The Limits of a PopularApproach to Environmental Governance, 163 China Q 677, 700 (2000).
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degree, but this Article suggests that the alternative approach at least merits
earnest consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
The gap between a given regulatory framework and its actual enforcement
is prevalent in most developing countries, including China." 9 However, it would
be incorrect to assume that effective implementation automatically follows once
the regulator harnesses political support for its mission and receives better
funding. The enforcement of government regulations entails costs that are
highly dependent upon quality information, which can be cumbersome for the
regulator to obtain because of the information asymmetry between the regulator
and regulated entities. The types of information mechanisms used within a
particular regulatory framework are thus of quintessential importance, for they
influence a regulated entity's incentives to disclose information and ultimately
determine the effectiveness of a given regulatory scheme. Improperly designed
information mechanisms pose a double threat-they may not only hinder the
flow of quality information, but may also divert resources from more potent
regulatory tools. In the case of China's EIAS, comprehensive public disclosure
and public participation requirements may improve information quality and
prompt the government and the market to take environmental considerations
into account when making decisions, but such requirements are also costly.
Placing the full burden on enterprises may be a normatively appealing solution,
especially to further causes like environmental protection at a time when the
level of material wealth in a country is low, but a more incisive analysis may
reveal that an alternative model better promotes the public's well-being in the
long run.
119 Id at 681.
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